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1 INTRODUCTION 
The world is changing at a rapid pace, and so is its economic structure. Europe 
is producing goods and services, such as compact disc players, computer games 
and financial derivatives that did not exist 40 years ago. Moreover, we export 
and import these and other goods and services to and from countries that did not 
even exist 7 years ago, such as Estonia of the Ukraine. We have witnessed the 
impressive rise to wealth of Japan, now followed by other countries in South 
East Asia, such as Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. At the same 
time, some countries in South America or Eastem Europe did not perform very 
well, while still others, mainly in Africa, actually become impoverished over time. 
The way our companies are organized has changed equally fast, such that 'just in 
time delivery' is now a household word. By the time everyone is used to com- 
municate by fax machines they are becoming largely obsolete through the intro- 
duction of more efficient electronic mail systems. It now looks like many less 
developed countries can basically skip the step of ordering copper or glass tele- 
phone cables because telecommunication satellites make wireless telephone calls 
to and from almost any place on earth possible. For some industries these rapid 
changes mean that their competitiveness on the global market diminishes to such 
an extent hat survival becomes almost impossible; the history of the textile in- 
dustry in a number of European countries erves as an example. Instead of facing 
the competitive challenge some industries have responded with a continued e- 
mand for protection, provided to some extent by their politicians. This has been 
called 'the senile industry argument for protection' or, less derogatory, 'New Pro- 
tectionism' (see Magee et al., 1989, chapter 17 for a survey). 
There are also other reasons for protectionism. Indeed, it is argued that pro- 
tectionist measures are required to counter the more covert trade policies of the 
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newly industrializing countries. At the beginning of 1995 the United States, after 
long and fruitless debates with China, announced the levying of 100% import 
tariffs on selected goods to coerce China to better fulfill its obligations in the 
realm of protecting intellectual property rights. Soon after the announcement 
China gave in. In May 1995 the United States announced the levying of 100% 
import tariffs on selected automobiles imported from Japan to coerce Japan to 
grant the United States better access to the Japanese automobile and car parts 
market. After many days of frantic negotiating Japan and the United States 
reached an agreement only a few hours before the announced tariffs would be 
imposed. President Clinton said the agreement was 'a great step to free trade 
throughout the world.' ~ Power politics pays off, or so it seems. In both cases the 
quality and verifiability of the reached agreement is questionable. The Chinese 
do not really seem to be interested in protecting American property rights, but 
did close a few small plants producing illegal compact discs. In the car conflict 
between Japan and the United States Mickey Kantor, the United States trade 
representative, mphasized that it is a voluntary agreement and said that 'there 
are no obligations between governments, American trade laws do not apply, and 
the numbers can change if economic circumstances do. '2 The countries of the 
European Union (especially France) have objected to the bilateral nature of the 
agreement (in contradiction with World Trade Organization rules), which threat- 
ens to put other countries at a disadvantage in exporting cars to Japan. Moreover, 
if the Americans are serious about boosting car exports to Japan they should put 
the steering wheel on the right hand side, as some US car manufacturers now 
start to do. 
Should Europe follow the power politics lead of the United States in trade 
policy, or should it try to shield its producers from the cold winds of interna- 
tional competition in a more covert or subtle way, as Japan and other successful 
nations are repeatedly accused of doing? 3 This essay addresses three specific 
questions raised by the editors of De Economist: 
1. What should be the structure of European trade policy in a world where in- 
ternational trade is increasingly dominated by intra-industry trade and multina- 
tional enterprises? 
2. How should Europe react to trade impediments imposed by other economic 
entities, such as the United States or Japan? 
3. How should Europe react to low-cost competition from other parts of the 
world, such as Eastern Europe or South East Asia? 
1 NRC Handelsblad, 29 June, 1995 (in Dutch). 
2 See footnote 1. 
3 Some myths on these covert ways play a role here, testifying Bhagwati's (1988, p. 69) anecdotal 
evidence on the difficulty Holland had in exporting tulip bulbs to Japan because the Japanese insisted 
on checking them by cutting the stems vertically down the middle. In reality, however, the problem 
was that he bulbs had to be in quarantine for one year (Dujat, 1995). 
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These broad questions touch upon a number of interesting aspects of interna- 
tional trade theory and policy. Adequately addressing these issues thus requires 
us to draw upon a plethora of theoretical arguments, practical observations and 
empirical research. Throughout his essay the reader should have one important 
premise in mind: Europe is special, but not too special. Europe is special in the 
sense that it has its own economic, social and cultural history, its own structural 
developments, etc. These issues are addressed below to a limited extent. Europe 
is, however, not special in the sense that it requires an entirely different eco- 
nomic analysis. There is no sharp distinction between trade theory in general and 
European trade theory. If an increase in intra-industry trade points to an increase 
in the importance of imperfect competition in general, this also holds for Europe 
to the extent hat Europe's level of intra-industry trade increases. If relatively au- 
tarkic trade policies prove to be disastrous for the Soviet Union, Argentina and 
North Korea, these policies can hardly be expected to be a blessing for the Eu- 
ropean Union. 
The first question above presupposes that international trade is increasingly 
dominated by intra-industry trade and multinational enterprises. Section 3 of this 
paper shows that this is indeed the case. The conclusion derived from this obser- 
vation is that imperfect competition is becoming ever more important in the world 
trading system. Thus, we answer the three questions raised above in the light of 
the increased importance of imperfect competition in a dynamically changing 
world economic system, see sections 4-6. To contrast our findings with the con- 
ventional wisdom of trade policy we start our analysis in section 2 below by 
briefly discussing the seemingly small costs of protection in a static framework 
of perfect competition. These seemingly low costs explain to some extent why 
protectionism exists and why many policy advisers again want to install protec- 
tionist measures as a relatively cheap policy instrument for a variety of economic 
and non-economic objectives. 
2 STANDARD ANALYSIS OF PROTECTIONISM AND INTERNATIONAL 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
2.1 Increasing International Interdependence 
World production has grown enormously since World War II. World trade, how- 
ever, has grown even faster. Europe is exporting and importing an ever increas- 
ing share of its products to and from other countries, be they far away or close 
by. This is illustrated in Table 1, showing that in just two decades the share of 
world production destined for other countries has increased by about 50% (from 
10.1% of GNP in 1970 to 15.4% of GNP in 1991). 4 In 1991 an impressive share 
4 Note that Table 1 suffers from the usual consistency problem inthat world imports are larger than 
world exports. 
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TABLE 1 - INCOME AND TRADE 
Country Exports Impogs Exports/GNP 
1991 ($b) 1991 ($b) 
1970% 1991% 
India 17.7 20.4 3.8 7.8 
China 72.1 63.8 1.8 19.5 
Indonesia 29.0 25.9 12.4 24.9 
Mexico 27.1 38.2 3.4 9.6 
Brazil 31.6 23.0 7.6 7.6 
S. Korea 71.7 81.3 9.0 25.3 
EC-12 1,366.0 1,447.1 16.5 22.4 
Spain 60.1 93.1 6.3 11.4 
U.K. 185.1 210.0 18.2 21.1 
Germany 401.8 387.9 18.9 22.4 
Canada 124.8 117.6 22.6 24.4 
U.S. 397.7 506.2 4.3 7.1 
Japan 314.4 234.1 9.5 9.4 
World 3,336.6 3,508.2 10.1 15.4 
Source: Markusen et al. (1995). Note that EC-12 imports and exports include intra-EC 
trade, see also footnote 5. 
of total world trade, some 40%, was accounted for by the 12 members of the 
European Union, much of which is intra-European Union trade. 5 Indeed, in that 
same year Germany was the world's largest exporter. The European level of in- 
ternational interdependence is high and has even increased. Of the many causes 
of this rise in international interdependence w  just want to mention the general 
decrease of relative transportation costs, the emergence of regional trading blocks 
(such as the European Union or ASEAN), and the completion of many successful 
GATT multilateral trade negotiation rounds. In view of the increased regional co- 
operation (the expansion of the European Union and the emergence of NAFTA) 
together with the recent successful completion of the Uruguay Round and the 
founding of the World Trade Organization, we can expect a continuing rise in the 
world level of international interdependence. With respect o the costs of man- 
aged trade or protectionism one would expect, solely based on the high and ris- 
ing level of international interdependence, high and rising costs of trade 
protection. 6 
5 Some 70 percent of European trade was intra-European U ion trade. 
6 This follows from the obvious observation that if international trade is absent, protection is (al- 
most) without welfare consequences and if all trade is international trade, the consequences are maxi- 
mal. 
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2.2 The Small Costs of  Protection 
Many studies on the welfare effects of trade liberalization concentrate on the 
European Union, which arguably serves as an example of the largest and most 
successful economic integration scheme in the world. In terms of institutional 
widening and deepening no other integration scheme is equally successful. To a 
large extent the growth of trade of the European Union is intra-European Union 
trade rather than trade with the rest of the world, partly due to the remarkable 
growth of non-tariff protection directed at third countries (Winters, 1993). This 
increase of non-tariff protection has often been excused by pointing at 'dumping' 
by producers from the Far East, the United States or Japan. Anti-dumping mea- 
sures are by far the most frequently used instruments for protectionism. Alterna- 
tively, protectionist measures in the European Union have taken the form of (ex- 
port) subsidies. These subsidies are mostly in the 'traditional' sectors, such as 
agriculture, fishing, coal and railways, but also in more high-tech sectors, such as 
airbus industries. On average, it seems that the European integration process di- 
minished protectionism in the world. This, however, does not apply to the ini- 
tially most liberal members; for example, the Union probably constrained Ger- 
many and The Netherlands in further liberalization (Winters, 1993). 
The welfare effects of trade liberalization in the European Union were mainly 
measured by estimating (net) producer and consumer surpluses, that is (variants) 
of the surfaces of the so-called Harberger triangles. 7 The measurements depend 
of course on the particular trade policies, but in a static competitive quilibrium 
framework there is equivalence between a tariff, an import quotum and an export 
tax. Furthermore, as Balassa (1976) observed, trade creation dominated trade 
diversion in the case of the European Union, which, within this framework, means 
that the Harberger triangles should be an acceptable approximation. 
Summarizing the studies on the welfare effects of the formation of the 
European Union Balassa (1975) found that this formation contributed to some 
0.5% of GDR Possible improvements of productivity gains, caused by larger mar- 
kets due to the formation of the European Union, are acknowledged, but no at- 
tempts to estimate this were made. s More recent estimates uggest hat the ef- 
fects of further removal of protectionist measures are only 0.2 to 0.3% of the 
GNP of the European Union (Emerson et al., 1992). 9 These studies therefore sug- 
7 The theory behind these triangles i basic textbook material. Any textbook on trade theory will 
do. For a more advanced treatment see Vousden (1990) or Brakman and Jepma (1995). 
8 Note that he relationship between size of the market and productivity also points to Verdoorn's 
Law. Indeed, the existence of economies of scale is often mentioned asan explanation fVerdoorn's 
Law. However, the generality of this law is not undisputed (see Fase and Winder, 1995). 
9 Emerson et aL also pay attention to the measurement of dynamic effects, which are notoriously 
difficult o estimate. It is suggested (pp. 78-79) that he 'medium-run growth bonus' could range 
between 24% and 136% of the initial small static gains, leading approximately to an additional 0.3% 
of GNP gain (and a total gain of 0.5-0.6% of GNP). 
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gest that the welfare effects of trade liberalization are quite small. The welfare 
effects may even be overstated because it is often assumed that the protectionist 
measures are completely abolished. Furthermore, one has to estimate import de- 
mand elasticities. Vousden (1990, p. 50) illustrates the sensitivity of the measure- 
ments of the welfare effects with respect o the values of the (compensated) price 
elasticities of demand for imports. In the calibrations these elasticities are often 
assumed to be relatively high, thus possibly overstating the welfare effects of a 
complete liberalization. Still, even with high demand elasticity estimates the wel- 
fare effects are small. For the United States, for example, the welfare effects of 
trade liberalization range between 0.01% and 0.1% of GDR In Japan, one of the 
countries most criticized for protecting its local market, protectionism is confined 
mostly to agiculture and a small number of manufacturing industries, some of 
which are highly protected. The net cost for the Japanese society as a whole in 
1989 ranges from 0.27% to 0.58% of GNP (Sazanami et al., 1995). For other 
countries the estimates are similarly small. 
Various reasons have been brought forward to explain the seemingly small es- 
timated welfare gains following trade liberalization. To a large extent he objec- 
tions do not question the static nature of the estimates, but instead question the 
implicit assumptions within a basically accepted methodology of measuring the 
Harberger triangles. Problems addressed are, for example, inter-sector labour mo- 
bility, the type of import-demand function used (often an 'Armington' type de- 
mand function), aggregation problems, possible substitution effects between dif- 
ferent types of importables, possible quality upgrading effects etc. Nevertheless, 
the welfare effects on the basis of this refined type of research remain small. The 
conclusion of the standard analysis within the neo-classical methodology is there- 
fore that (Vousden, 1990, p. 51): '..the conventional static welfare costs of  tariffs.. 
are quite insignificant in relative terms.' 
A more fundamental criticism questions the underlying model on which the 
traditional welfare estimates are based. Basically, this underlying model is char- 
acterized by trade in homogeneous goods and perfect competition. The models 
incorporating these basic features are the neo-classical trade models, the most fa- 
mous of which is the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model. How much of the world 
trading pattern can be explained using the perfect competition factor endowment 
theory? The answer to this question was given by Leamer (1984) and Bowen 
et al. (1987), among others, t° 
Tests of the H-O model relate relative factor endowments to net trade in these 
factors. Countries which have a particular production factor in abundance are ex- 
pected to be net exporters of that factor (as embodied in international trade of 
goods and services). Bowen et al. (1987) perform two tests: first, a sign test for 
the relation of relative factor abundance and net factor exports; second a rank 
test, where the ranking of relative factor abundance should conform to the rank- 
10 The literature on empirical tests of the H-O model is surveyed in Learner (1994, 1995). 
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ing of net factor exports, They find about 35% violations of the expected signs 
implied by the H-O model and about 50% violations of the rank test and con- 
clude that the H-O model in general performs poorly (see also Learner, 1994). 
Other factors must be important in determining the unexplained part of world 
trade patterns. The next section identifies the missing link in explanatory power 
of the H-O model, indicating that world trade must to a large extent be explained 
by other models than the H-O model. This turns out to be of crucial importance 
in explaining the low estimates of the welfare costs of protection in the tradi- 
tional analysis. 
2.3 Protection 
The small estimated costs of protection have contributed to a continued supply of 
protection, as indicated in Tables 2 and 3 below which show that tariff and non- 
tariff barriers remain high even after the Uruguay Round. After all, if a variety of 
interest groups demand protectionist measures, both on economic and non-eco- 
nomic grounds, it is tempting for politicians to give in to these demands if the 
estimated costs are small. The European Common Agricultural Policy can serve 
as an example. Regional and national politicians and interest groups demand spe- 
cific measures to protect and preserve their agricultural traditions and interests. 
This holds for almost all European countries and agricultural industries and re- 
sults in high across-the-board protection. The detrimental effects of this outcome 
are further discussed in the following section. 
The success of the Uruguay Round can best be seen by comparing the second 
column with the third column in Table 2. For the industrial countries it is shown 
that, taking the applied rates as the base values, the import-weighted average 
tariffs on industrial imports will decline from 5.0 percent o 3.6 percent. For the 
European Union the decline is larger, from 5.7 percent o 3.6 percent. In a quali- 
tative sense the same conclusion holds for the Non-tariff Barriers (NTBs); 
Table 3 reveals that the most important forms of non-tariff protection have de- 
clined. 
A more detailed analysis of the individual items reveals that the tariff reduc- 
tions differ considerably across products. The most dramatic tariff reductions have 
been made in sectors where the rates were low already, such as paper, pulp, fur- 
niture, metals, and nonelectric machinery. More limited cuts have been made in 
'sensitive' sectors where the adjustment costs for the domestic industries and em- 
ployees are considered high, such as textiles and clothing, transport equipment, 
steel, autos, aircraft, electronics, leather, rubber, and footwear. It seems hard for 
governments o restrain protectionist pressures, especially in the form of Volun- 
tary Export Restraints (VERs) and anti-dumping measures. Nevertheless, the IMF 
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TABLE 2 - PRE AND POST-URUGUAY ROUND TARIFFS ON INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS H 
Import,Weighted Import-Weighted Import-Weighted 
Average Bound Average Applied Average Bound 
Rates Rates Rates 
Pre-Uruguay Round Pre-Uruguay Round Post-Uruguay Round 
Industrial Countries 6.0 5.0 3.6 
European Union 5.7 5.7 3.6 
Japan 3.9 1.9 1.7 
United States 5.4 5.4 3.5 
Developing Countries 
Argentina 38.2 20.0 30.9 
Brazil 40.7 15.0 27.0 
Korean Rep. 18.0 7.9 8.3 
Malaysia 10.0 9.1 9.1 
Thailand 35.8 35.8 28.1 
Transition Economies 
Czech Rep. 4.9 5.7 3.8 
Hungary 9.6 11.0 6.9 
Poland 16.0 11.6 9.9 
Romania 11.8 11.8 33.9 
Souce: IMF, 1994, Volume I, p. 14 and Volume II, p. 6. 
TABLE 3 - TRADE COVERAGE RATIOS OF CORE NON-TARIFF BARRIERS (NTBs) FOR 
THER EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES; (IN PERCENT OF IMPORTS 
COVERED) 
1988 1993 
Core NTBs 14.6 14.0 
Quant. restrictions 12.1 9.8 
Export restraints 8.0 6.6 
Anti-dumping 2.4 3.7 
Other price measures 1.6 1.6 
Source: IMF, 1994, Volume I, p. 8. 
11 Bound rates are the official tariff rates, which are the result of (previous) GATr negotiations and 
serve as a maximum tariff rate. Applied rates are the actual tariff rates, which are usually lower than 
the bound rates. 
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(1994) concludes that protectionist pressures and trade frictions remain present 
and are escalating in some areas, la 
3 THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 
Of the many changes that the world economic system has witnessed over the 
past few decades we highlight wo observations that are significant for this essay, 
namely (/) the importance of intra-industry trade, and (i/) the importance of the 
services sector. These two facts highlight the shortcomings of the neo-classical 
model. Moreover, they point to a conclusion, namely the increasing importance 
of imperfect competition in international trade. These findings are in correspon- 
dence with the presupposition of question 1 discussed in the introduction. 
3.1 The High-Level of  lntra-industry Trade 
Most of world trade, some 57 percent in 1990, is trade between developed na- 
tions. Most of that trade, in turn, is intra-industry trade, or the simultaneous im- 
porting and exporting of similar products. Gmbel and Lloyd (1975) demonstrated 
the high and rising level of intra-industry trade before there was a theoretical 
explanation. Why is France simultaneously exporting wine to and importing wine 
from Italy? Grubel and Lloyd's empirical finding greatly stimulated further em- 
pirical and theoretical research in international trade. The most convincing theo- 
retical explanations of the phenomenon of intra-industry trade rely on scale econo- 
mies, product differentiation and imperfect competition, thus forming a 
fundamental break with standard neo-classical trade theory which is based on con- 
stant returns to scale, homogeneous goods and perfect competition. 13Table 4 il- 
lustrates the high level of intra-industry trade, both in manufactured inputs, such 
as machinery, electronics and chemicals, and in manufactured final goods, such 
12 Within the methodology of this section, the IMF estimates the tariff and non-tariff reductions of
the Uruguay Round to lead to an increase inworld income after a full implementation at somewhere 
between $212 billion and $274 billion (IMF, Volume II, p. 1), or approximately 1%of world income. 
13 Some important contributions are: Kmgman (1979, 1980), Ethier (1982), and Helpman and Krug- 
man (1985). The static theories of intra-industry ade and inter-industry ade were elegantly com- 
bined with quasi-homogeneous demand by Markusen (1986) to explain the world level, structure and 
direction of trade. Grossman and Helpman (1991) investigate imperfect ompetition a d international 
trade in a dynamic framework where returns to scale arise from the research and development costs 
required to invent a new variety or improve the quality of an existing variety. Krugman (1991) gives 
due attention tothe location aspect identified by Balassa (1986) by incorporating transport costs in a 
model with both perfect and imperfect ompetition. This gives rise to positive feedbacks for loca- 
tions, because industrial ctivity implies higher demand for differentiated goods and thus attracts more 
industrial ctivity, etc. Marknasen tal. (1995, p. 204) also point o industrial c assification asa de- 
terminant of intra-industry ade. Some trade is misleadingly measured asintra-industry ade because 
it is based on e.g. seasonal growing variations, orthe simultaneous import and export for mid-product 
processing. 
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TABLE 4 - INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE INDEX, 1990 
Commodity Canada Germany Japan S. Korea U.K. U.S. 
Fuels 73.1 31.8 4.7 11.9 99.9 30.7 
Chemicals 92.8 75.8 99.0 50.6 89.9 75.0 
Special Machinery 62.5 45.6 35.5 26.9 89.7 91.8 
Computers 46.3 74.7 39.0 68.4 95.3 99.8 
Automobiles 79.7 58.7 26.0 10.1 62.3 37.5 
Clothing 24.1 52.1 0.2 0.2 60.7 17.3 
Precision Instruments 48.9 71.6 70.4 37.6 91.6 67.7 
Source: Markusen et al. (1995); the numbers indicate the share of intra-industry trade in 
total trade, measured by the Grubel-Lloyd index (100 if all trade is intra-industry trade; 
zero if all trade is inter-industry trade). 
as automobiles. Intra-industry trade is particularly important in Europe, see e.g. 
Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Empirical research on the testing of intra-industry trade theories is only just 
beginning and suffers from a number of specific difficulties: it is hard to find 
variables that closely measure the hypothetical variables suggested by theory 
(product differentiation, economies of scale, market identification, type of inter- 
industry cooperation, etc.), each of which has different implications for the em- 
pirical relations (see also Fase, 1985). This means that the null hypothesis and 
alternative hypotheses are hard to formulate (think, for example, of the differ- 
ences between non-cooperative oligopoly or cooperative oligopoly). These diffi- 
culties imply that simple indices of intra-industry trade are often related to vari- 
ables which loosely measure some of the relations suggested by theory (Learner, 
1994, p. 86). The theoretical literature suggests, for instance, that the following 
variables can explain intra-industry trade: (i) similarity in the level of per capita 
GNP, (ii) geographic-proximity, (iii) smaller trade restrictions, (iv) mutual bor- 
ders, and (v) economically integrated areas. The empirical study performed by 
Balassa (1986) confirms these relationships. These findings imply that the imple- 
mentation of the latest GATT talks (the start of the WTO talks), and a continued 
economic integration of Europe, will further increase the level of intra-industry 
trade. 
3.2 The Increasing Importance of Services 
The arguments above, which indicate that the neo-classical trade model does not 
perform well in describing the present structure of international trade flows, is 
further strengthened by the fact that a substantial share of European trade is ser- 
vices trade. Services play an increasingly important role in today's world 
economy, as observed, for example, by the growing share in employment, pro- 
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duction, exports, and foreign direct investment, see e.g. OECD (1993), UNCTAD 
and World Bank (1994) and Van Marrewijk, Stibora and De Vaal (1996). This 
growing importance of services in domestic economies and international trade, 
acknowledged by the political forum as testified by the inclusion of services in 
the Uruguay Round negotiations, is largely due to an increase in the production 
of producer services, see Grubel and Walker (1989), and OECD (1992). 14 It has 
been estimated that the total value of across-the-border s vice trade is $900 bil- 
lion and that the value of services supplied by foreign subsidiaries of multina- 
tional firms is about $3000 billion (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1994, 
p. 92). Firms increasingly delegate costly, knowledge-intensive ntermediate-stage 
processing activities in their production process to specialized outside producers 
in order to gain cost advantages. Both the existence of considerable scale econo- 
mies and the need to specialize services to the requirements of the buyer (pro- 
vide many different varieties) necessitate he modeling of services provision in a 
framework of imperfect competition. 
3.3 Imperfect Competition 15
The high level of intra-industry and services trade indicates that world trade in 
general and European Union trade in particular is characterized by imperfect com- 
petition based on product differentiation and economies of scale (subsection 3.1). 
Similarly, the importance of services in general, and in the share of exports in 
particular, also indicates an increased importance of product variety and econo- 
mies of scale in models of imperfect competition (subsection 3.2). Finally, the 
impact of international trade policy is increasing due to rising international inter- 
dependence (section 2). Thus, the stylized facts of the world economy discussed 
so far lead to the following conclusion: the importance of imperfect competition 
in international trade is considerable. Corroborating evidence is found in the in- 
creasing importance of multinational enterprises. There were some 37,000 multi- 
national corporations with 170,000 foreign subsidiaries in 1991. Despite the rapid 
rise in world exports the sales of these foreign subsidiaries have increased more 
than three times as fast in the'period 1960-1991, and are now actually larger than 
the total value of world exports. In that same period the share of foreign direct 
investment in total investments more than doubled. The next section of this paper 
investigates the consequences of the increased importance of imperfect competi- 
tion for practical international trade policy prescriptions. 
14 The negotiations, which were very difficult, resulted inthe GATS (General Agreement on Trade 
in Services) on December 15, 1993. Negotiations onservices trade still continue, now within the 
World Trade Organization. 
15 The data in this subsection are from the UNCTAD (1993) World Investment Report. 
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4 THE UNDERESTIMATED COSTS OF PROTECTION 
This section answers the first two questions posed in the introduction: what should 
European trade policy be in a world increasingly dominated by imperfect com- 
petition and how should Europe respond to protectionist measures imposed by its 
trading partners? The answer based on traditional economic analysis, with perfect 
competition and low estimated costs of protection, is that protection could in prin- 
ciple be used as a policy tool. For example, the use of protection to cater to the 
needs of specific interest groups (e.g. airbus industries), or the imposition of tariffs 
to extort concessions from trading partners is, within this framework, thought o 
be relatively harmless from a welfare perspective. 16 We question the crucial em- 
pirical findings of the low estimated costs of protection because these findings 
are based on the, at least partially irrelevant, premise of perfect competition (see 
section 3). Accurately estimating the costs of protection and trade barriers, or the 
gains from economic integration, is extremely difficult. In (dynamic) models of 
imperfect competition in which new goods and services are invented over time 
and characterized by economies of scale, the costs of protection can potentially 
be much higher than the traditional measurements of the welfare costs of protec- 
tion suggest. The purpose of this section is to substantiate his claim. 
4.1 Static Costs of Protection under Imperfect Competition 
Empirical studies on the cost of protection under imperfect competition, excel- 
lently surveyed in Richardson (1988), indicate that the costs of protection are 
generally higher under imperfect competition. Indeed, Richardson (1988) in his 
survey concludes (p. 2): 'the gains could be two to three times the size of those 
estimated under traditional assumptions.' For example, typical estimates of the 
gains from economic integration between Canada and the United States in a static, 
perfect competition framework, taking trade creation and trade diversion into ac- 
count, estimate the gain to Canada in the order of magnitude of 1 percent of 
GNP. Instead, Harris (1991), using a static computable general equilibrium model 
that allows for economies of scale arrives at a 3 times larger gain for Canada 
(3.2 Percent of GNP), mainly resulting from a better use of such scale econo- 
mies. Larger gains, one might say, but still not quite spectacular. Feenstra (1995) 
argues that the application of static techniques to imperfect markets uggests that 
the welfare effects of trade liberalization are somewhat higher than traditional per- 
fect competition measurements, because foreign firms will in general only partly 
pass the tariff rate through to consumers resulting in an (extra) terms of trade 
gain for the tariff-imposing country. In general the empirical studies investigating 
16 It should be noted that tariffs are only a second-best instrument if politicians want to transfer 
income to their favoured constituency. A tariff creates an overall distortion in the economy. A lump- 
sum transfer or a suitable combination of consumer or producer taxes and subsidies is clearly better 
than a tariff from a welfare point of view (Dixit and Norman, 1980). 
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the welfare effects of trade from better use of scale economies through an expan- 
sion of plant output find mixed or only mildly positive results, see e.g. Tybout 
(1993). This is not surprising if we keep in mind the most simple intra-industry 
trade model based on variety with constant elasticity of substitution which does 
not predict any change in operating size of plants. Instead, the gains from trade 
in such an economy come exclusively from quality improvements, a love-of-va- 
riety effect (for consumer goods) or external economies of scale (for intermedi- 
ates), all of which are notoriously difficult to handle empirically. 
An indication of the costs of protection under imperfect competition for Europe 
can be given by using the gravity model, which states that economic proximity 
and trade flows are positively related. The gravity model initially had a mixed 
reputation: successful empirically, but relying on questionable assumptions to de- 
rive the model theoretically. 17 Recently, however, the gravity model has regained 
some acceptance because its basic equation can be derived from models with in- 
creasing returns to scale, product differentiation and imperfect markets (see 
Appendix A). 18 
Our empirically estimated log-linear formulation of the gravity model is19: 
T;j = - 28.04 + 0.6296"Y~ + 0.8571"Yj + 0.0599"N~ + 0.1514*Nj -
(57.8) (42.240) (55.925) (2.942) (7.515) 
- 1.0294*Dij - 1.3367"[P i + Pj] 
( -33 .500)  ( -  11.598) (1) 
where t-statistics are given in parentheses; Tij is trade flow from country i to 
country j; Yi (Yj) is Gross National Product of country i (and j, respectively); Dij 
is the economic distance between countries i and j; Ni (N) is the population size 
of country i (and j, respectively); this is a proxy for scale economies; and Pg (P)  
is an indicator for protectionist measures of country i (and j, respectively). Bilat- 
eral trade is large if both countries are (economically) large (in GNP and popu- 
lation), the distance is small and trade barriers are low. 
The influence of protection on trade flows, using the gravity model, can be 
calculated as follows. First, the gravity model is estimated including actual pro- 
tectionist measures, see equation (1). Second, on the basis of this estimation the 
hypothetical trade flows can be calculated by assuming that the barriers of trade 
are absent. The trade flows predicted by the model without barriers to trade rela- 
17 The traditional standard formulation suggests hat he model can only be used under special cir- 
cumstances, for example if bilateral trade flows are in equilibrium (see Brakman, 1991). 
18 Furthermore, Helpman (1987) and Hummels and Levinsohn (1993) show that current account 
imbalances hardly bias the estimations. 
19 Based on 5984 actual data entries, starting with 1992 bilateral trade data for 199 countries. Ad- 
justed R-square: 0.61, F-statistic: 1555.34, see Appendix B for further details. 
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TABLE 5 - PREDICTED INCREASE IN TRADE FLOWS WITHOUT PROTECTION 
Country Export to ROW Import from ROW 
United Kingdom 1.252 1.194 
Belgium/Luxembourg 1.456 1.261 
Denmark 1.175 1.163 
France 1.224 1.189 
Germany 1.236 1.208 
Italy 1.209 1.225 
Netherlands 1.240 1.216 
Greece 1.206 1.260 
Ireland 1.116 1.105 
Portugal 1.191 1.280 
Spain 1.280 1.268 
Export to EU Import from EU 
United Kingdom 1.069 1.069 
Belgium/Luxembourg 1.093 1.094 
Denm ark 1.103 1.105 
France 1.072 1.072 
Germany 1.094 1.095 
Italy 1.073 1.073 
Netherlands 1.101 1.100 
Greece 1.099 1.100 
Ireland 1.063 1.058 
Portugal 1.111 1.110 
Spain 1.100 1.099 
The entries in the table give the trade flows predicted by the model without barriers to 
trade relative to the actual trade flows. ROW indicates the Rest of the World, EU indicates 
European Union. 
Source: own calculations, ee Appendix B. 
tive to the actual trade flows give an indication of the influence of protectionist 
measures. 2°Table 5 presents these calculations for some European countries, both 
the trade within the European Union and outside the European Union. Thus, fol- 
lowing this procedure, the worldwide abolishment of tariffs leads to an estimated 
increase in Dutch exports (imports) to (from) the countries of the European Union 
of 10.1% (10.0%) and to (from) the Rest of The World of 24.0% (21.6%). These 
estimates and their size are rather typical for most European countries: within 
20 That is, the predicted export from country i to country j without trade barriers i  equal to the 
actual export from country i to country j divided by exp[- 13367(Pc+P j)].This methodology has the 
advantage that it accommodates actual trade idiosyncrasies not predicted by the model. 
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Europe the gains from diminishing protection are smaller than with respect o the 
Rest of The World, as might be expected for countries within a preferential trade 
agreement. 
The calculations in Table 5 give an indication of the static trade-related costs 
of protection. Although substantial, we argue below that these values still under- 
estimate the dynamic costs of protection. Indeed, a second, and much more im- 
portant, shortcoming of the empirical studies on the cost of protection is the ab- 
sence of adequate dynamics. As Richardson (1988, p. 14) in his survey puts it: 
'All of  the empirical research...is in essence an empirical analog to comparative 
statics' which, moreover, is 'more art than science.' This is indicated most clearly 
in the study of Daniella Markheim (1994) evaluating the accuracy of 10 ex ante 
studies on the projected trade effects of 7 different preferential trade agreements, 
5 of which pertain to Europe. She finds that only 5 years after the investigated 
preferential trade agreements ake effect no less than between 49.7 per cent and 
99.8 per cent of the actual increase in trade flows is not predicted by the ex ante 
studies. 2a The ex ante studies therefore uniformly underestimate he impact of 
trade policy changes on trade flows, regardless of the type of trade policy change 
or the level of development of the implementing countries. Apparently, trade 
policy changes invoke countries to shift larger amounts of resources towards the 
production and supply of exports which is not fully accounted for in the calcu- 
lation of ex ante estimates. This demonstrates that dynamics, not statics, should 
be the driving motivation behind economic integration and international coopera- 
tion. We will argue our case below through historical anecdotes, two numerical 
examples, and a theoretical discussion of growth effects. 
4.2 Dynamic Costs of  Protection under Imperfect Competition 
4.2.1 History and protection 
To remove the static nature of empirical studies on the cost of protection one 
would like to investigate the consequences of trade policy changes over a some- 
what longer period. After the feudal period Japan moved from virtual autarky in 
1858 to nearly free trade in the 1870s. The trade level jumped from practically 
zero to 7 percent of GNP, the terms of trade improved by 340 percent, and na- 
tional income rose by about 65 percent in 15 years. This development in Japan 
strongly suggests that there is a relationship between the growth of national in- 
come and protectionism, see Huber (1971) for further details. 
Other indications of the dynamic benefits of international free trade over a 
longer period are provided by different developmental strategies. India, for ex- 
ample, has had an inward-looking strategy of development, based on import sub- 
stitution, for a long time and, as is evidenced from Table 1, was not particularly 
21 The best performance (49.7% of the increase is not predicted) is a study by Miller and Spencer 
(I977) estimating a 50% increase in exports from the UK to the EC. 
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successful. Other countries, e.g. in South America, could be used to illustrate the 
same point. The more successful South East Asian countries adopted in general 
rather open and outward-oriented development strategies based on export promo- 
tion. This does not mean that a country such as South Korea never adopted an 
import substitution policy, because it did. It does mean that whenever such a 
policy was adopted it was based on an infant industry argument and the ultimate 
goal was to export such goods over time. 22 Finally, a fair case can be built on 
the hypothesis that the inward-looking nature of the East European countries, 
which shielded their economies from the fierce competition and technological nd 
product innovations of  the world economy, can at least partially explain the col- 
lapse of the system some 7 years ago. 23 
The examples above clearly suggest a relationship between openness and eco- 
nomic growth. 24 Studies explicitly dealing with this issue, mostly employing 
cross-country comparisons, find that growth often is enhanced by openness, see 
Sachs and Warner (1995). 
4.2.2 New products and protection 
Romer (1994) gives an excellent description of the welfare costs of protection if 
new and useful goods and services are invented over time. The traditional mea- 
surements of the welfare effects of protection all calculate the possible costs 
within an existing set of products. It is crucial to note that the Harberger tri- 
angles, which are the basic welfare measures of the traditional analysis, can only 
be measured if products are actually present in an economy. This could seriously 
understate the true cost of protection if protection results in fewer products of 
lower quality than would otherwise exist: if products are not developed ue to 
protectionism the associated consumer surplus or income will never be realized. 
Due to the very nature of this argument empirical results do not exist. Nonethe- 
less, a simple example can illustrate the potentially impressive size of these costs 
(see Romer, section 7, for details). 
The model is given a rudimentary time dimension, which suffices for our pur- 
poses, by distinguishing between expected and unexpected policy measures. Take 
22 The South Korean shipbuilding and automobile industries can serve as examples here. 
23 In a survey of the literature on the relation between exports and growth Greenaway and Sapsford 
(1994) find that the methodology of research partly determines the answer: in cross-section studies 
the relation between exports and growth appears positive, while in time-series analysis the same de- 
gree of agreement on the relationship s absent. 
24 Well-known studies on the link between openness and growth are co-ordinated by Bhagwati and 
Kmeger in the NBER multi-country project on 'trade regimes and economic development.' The over- 
all conclusion of this project supports the notion that growth is stimulated by openness. The literature 
on this subject and the methodological problems concerned are surveyed by Learner (1994). 
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a country whose output level Y is a function of labour L and a large number of 
different types of capital goods x indexed by i: 
n 
r = c { E (2) 
i=1  
The capital goods are all imperfect substitutes for one another and can be thought 
of in physical terms, such as blast furnaces, buildings, computers, and fork lift 
trucks, or in terms of intermediate specialized human capital services, such as 
accounting, engineering, and banking. Given the number of varieties n there are 
constant returns to scale in the economy: a doubling of all inputs leads to a dou- 
bling of output. However, an increase in the number of varieties, i.e. the inven- 
tion of a new (physical or human) capital good, necessitates a reallocation of 
capital inputs and also causes a rise in production. The increase in the number of 
varieties affects the marginal productivity of the other inputs. This is a positive 
externality which is not taken explicitly into consideration by the inventors of 
new varieties. 
Suppose, for simplicity, that the inventors of a capital good, or the entrepre- 
neurs owning the rights of production of a particular capital good, all live abroad. 
It is well-known that for the production function given in equation (2) the elas- 
ticity of demand for a particular variety of a capital good is constant (and equal 
to 2 in this case). This implies a simple optimal pricing rule for the entrepreneurs 
to maximize profits, namely a constant mark-up (also of 2) over marginal costs. 
The latter are assumed to be constant. Gross profits from selling a good in this 
market then turn out to be half of total sales. The basic decision facing the en- 
trepreneurs is whether or not to introduce the capital good on the market. Sup- 
pose that the costs of introduction are (linearly) rising with the index i. These 
costs represent, for example, the costs of setting up a services and parts supply 
network, or setting up a local branch consulting office. The entrepreneur will only 
introduce the capital good on the market if the gross profit from sales is higher 
than the cost of introducing the good on the market. Without any government 
intervention this decision endogenously determines the number of capital good 
varieties introduced on the market and a benchmark production level Y*. 
Consider the effects of government intervention in the form of imposing an ad 
valorem tax or tariff ~- on all purchases of foreign imported goods under two 
different experiments. 25The first is to calculate the loss in output, relative to the 
benchmark Y*, resulting from an unexpected government action, that is after the 
entrepreneurs decided on the introduction of their capital good on the market. 
Because entry costs are sunk costs this unanticipated government policy does not 
affect the number of varieties available in the economy. Such a policy does af- 
25 Since all intermediate goods are imported an import ariff and a tax on intermediate inputs have 
the same effect. 
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fect, however, the mark-up decision of the entrepreneur because of the wedge 
between the price paid by the final goods producer and received by the interme- 
diate goods supplier (actually, the mark-up changes at the rate 1/(1-~-)). These 
higher prices lead to lower imports of capital goods and result in lower output. 
Romer (1994) calculates the unexpected cost of protection (measured as the re- 
duction of output relative to the benchmark Y*) as:26 
unexpected cost of protection = z 2 ( = short-run costs of protection) (3) 
We identify the short-run costs of protection with the unexpected costs because 
in the short run there is no significant change in the number of physical or hu- 
man capital goods available. The second tax experiment is to calculate the loss in 
output, relative to the benchmark Y*, resulting from an expected government ac- 
tion, that is before the entrepreneurs decide on the introduction of their capital 
good on the market. Because the tax rate lowers after tax profits since the higher 
mark-up reduces the quantity sold of a particular capital good this anticipated 
government action reduces the number of varieties introduced on the market. This 
loss in variety is an important additional cost of protection. Romer (1994) calcu- 
lates the expected cost of protection (also measured as the reduction of output 
relative to the benchmark Y*) as: 
expected cost of protection = 2~-  2" r  3 q- 7 4 
( = long-run costs of protection) (4) 
Figure 1 illustrates the short-run and long-run costs of protection in this simple 
framework. The long-run costs of protection are significantly higher than the 
short-run costs of protection. For example, if the tax rate is 20%, the reduction in 
output is 4% if this policy is unexpected (short run), and an astounding 38.6% if 
this policy is expected (long run). Thus, the short-run costs of protection are sig- 
nificant, but bearab leY Over time, however, new and useful goods and services 
are invented abroad which are not introduced on the domestic market because the 
(by now anticipated) degree of protection ensures that the costs of introduction 
cannot be covered by the gross operating profits. Thus, the long-run costs of pro- 
26 The intuition underlying equations (3) and (4) can be understood asfollows. Income in Romer's 
model equals the share of labour in gross domestic product plus tariff revenue. Gross domestic pro- 
duct is a function of labour, the number of varieties and the volume per variety. Fu~hermore, the 
number of varieties, N, is a function of the tariff rate, v. These expressions are substituted in an 
equation which measures the efficiency loss for the economy as a fraction of national income relative 
to the benchmark income [Y*(O)-Y('r)]/Y*(O). Equation (3) follows if z is substituted in this expres- 
sion for a given number of varieties and (4) follows if ~- is also allowed to affect he number of 
varieties. 
27 The order of magnitude roughly corresponds to empirical estimates. 
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Figure 1 - The costs of protection 
tection are very high, much higher than the analysis in section 2 suggest, and 
therefore in the long run ultimately unbearable for most countries. 
4.2.3 Quality and protection 
The high costs of protection are further amplified if we take into consideration 
the fact that most production processes are subdivided into several tasks. For ex- 
ample, in the production of cut flowers one task may be the picking of the flower, 
a second task the transportation of cut flowers to a central production area, where 
a third task is the sorting of the flowers with respect o colour, size and quality, 
a fourth task may be temporary watering of cut and sorted flowers, a fifth task 
the packaging, a sixth task transportation to the auction, and so on, and so forth. 
At each step there is a certain probability of mishandling of the product, depend- 
ing on the quality of the people performing the task, which renders the product 
useless (or diminishes its value). Kremer (1993) analyzes a simplified version of 
such 'O-ring' production functions. 28 Let q be the probability that a certain pro- 
duction task is performed satisfactorily and let n be the number of production 
tasks. Kremer shows that it is optimal for a producer to hire people of the same 
28 The name 'O-ring' production function is derived from the space shuttle Challenger, which con- 
sisted of thousands of different components before its fatal journey. Of those thousands of compo- 
nents the 'O-ring' malfunctioned, rendering the end product worthless in a violent explosion. 
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skill level (identical q) and that the wage paid is proportional to qn.29 TO the 
extent that trade restrictions prevent bypassing of domestic bottleneck sectors, 
such restrictions can diminish domestic productivity. This reasoning assumes that 
protection induces domestic producers to perform tasks in their own factory which 
could be more efficiently performed by (specialized) foreign firms. 
Suppose, for example, that low domestic apacity or quality in one of the pro- 
duction steps is accommodated by an 80% reliability (q=0.80) in a simple pro- 
duction process. If the alleviation of trade restrictions now mildly increases reli- 
ability by 10% from q=0.80 to q=0.88, this leads to a dramatic 10-fold increase 
in total productivity and the wage rate if there are at least 24 production steps 
(n --- 24). Even a meager 1% reliability improvement would raise wages and total 
productivity by more than 27% under such circumstances. Similar calculations 
for complicated production processes involving several hundreds or even thou- 
sands of production stages or components lead to productivity gains that numb 
the mind. 3° 
4.2.4 Dynamic theories and protection 
On the theoretical side, Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) analyze the effects of 
protection and economic integration on the growth rate of the economy by dis- 
tinguishing a production sector and a research and development (R&D) sector 
responsible for the increase in the (domestic or world) stock of knowledge. Let 
F(Z) to the production function of the R&D sector, where Z is a vector of in- 
puts. Economic integration of two identical countries within this framework can, 
in principle, either increase or decrease the growth rate of the economy. Three 
effects are important in this respect. First, to the extent that there are economies 
of scale in the R&D sector, the integration effect will increase the rate of eco- 
nomic growth, i.e. F(2Z) < 2F(Z). Second, to the extent that the output of the 
R&D sector is duplicated in the two countries in the absence of economic inte- 
gration, a redundancy effect will also increase the growth rate of the economy 
because it will free resources for productive use. That is, in an integrated world 
no resources will be wasted to re-invent he wheel, the compact disc, or the high- 
definition television. Given the distribution of human capital over the productive 
29 Basically, this follows from optimizing revenue minus cost of employing labour and capital. The 
wage rate, w, is a function of quality or reliability, q6 [0,1], which measures the average probability 
that a specific task is performed successfully. The production function in this optimization problem is 
y=k~qnnB, where k is capital, B the output per worker and n the number of tasks. From the first- 
order condition we have w'(q)=q(~-l)nBk% integrating this expression gives the result stated in the 
text (the integration constant is zero due to the fact that total revenue quals payment to capital and 
labour). 
30 Even in the fairly simple cut flower example it is easy to identify more than 100 different tasks 
to be performed. Just think, for example, of the various ubstages of plant selection, ursing, plant- 
ing, weed control, pest control, fertilizing, heating, etc. Not even mentioning the selling of the flow- 
ers at the auction and the route from the auction to the consumer. 
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sector and the research and development sector this leads to higher growth. Third, 
to the extent hat the process of economic integration changes the relative prices 
of capital goods, skilled and unskilled labour and the like, this entails a redistri- 
bution of those inputs between the production sector and the R&D sector. This 
allocation effect increases the growth rate if resources are shifted into the R&D 
sector, and reduces the growth rate otherwise. As Rivera-Batiz and Romer show 
the third effect can potentially dominate the first two effects. 
There is some support for this model. Haaland and Norman (1992) show, in a 
general equilibrium world trade model, that the establishment of a unified single 
market within Europe will shift resources to the R&D or skill-intensive ngineer- 
ing sectors, and stimulate conomic growth. 
We acknowledge that the preliminary theoretical work of Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer is important, but at the same time want to point out some of its limita- 
tions. First, the authors assume that the R&D sector uses only human capital (and 
knowledge spillovers) for its production. Thus, no physical capital goods or un- 
skilled labourers, no supercolliders, computers, buildings or janitors, are used to 
produce product or process innovations. 31Second, the world stock of knowledge 
enters in the R&D sector after the process of economic integration and it is as- 
sumed, rather than analyzed, that the production processes in the R&D sectors of 
Japan, Europe and the United States are integrated. Thus, knowledge generated 
in a laboratory in Japan flows freely, and instantaneously, to laboratories in Italy, 
Germany and The Netherlands. This contrasts trongly with the importance of 
proximity in knowledge spillovers stressed by many others, see e.g. Krugman 
(1991) with California's Silicon Valley (and Malaysia's budding Penang Island) 
as the standard example, and Head et al. (1995) for empirical evidence on a va- 
riety of industries. Third, it is again assumed rather than analyzed that economic 
integration will abolish the phenomenon of redundancy. The doubtfulness of this 
assumption is illustrated by the fact that even within the same country a number 
of firms are usually working on the same problem. In Japan, for example, a num- 
ber of firms are working simultaneously on developing high-definition televi- 
sions. Even if economic integration were to reduce the world-wide number of 
firms working on the same problem, it is questionable whether this reduction in 
'redundancy' is always beneficial as it might at the same time reduce competi- 
tion. Indeed, one might argue that the increase from the domestic to the world 
number of firms working on the same problem is an important source of pro- 
competitive gains from trade. Finally, some economists also question the basic 
ideas underlying the endogenous growth literature, see e.g. Solow (1994). 
31 A companion paper (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991b) uses the equally restrictive assumption that 
R&D technology is identical to that of goods and services production. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
The answer to the first two questions posed in the introduction must now be clear: 
in a dynamic world economy pervaded by imperfect competition it is important, 
more so than in a world characterized by perfect competition, that European trade 
policy is directed at free and open markets, no tariffs, quotas or other non-tariff 
barriers should be imposed because this is detrimental to European welfare and 
economic development. Furthermore, traditional (perfect competition) analysis of 
the welfare costs of protection possibly underestimates the actual costs of protec- 
tion (in the presence of imperfect competition), which increases the temptation 
for policymakers to give in to demands for protectionist measures. In a first-best 
Pareto-optimal world, i.e. under perfect cdmpetition, all interventions ( uch as tar- 
iffs) have small second-order welfare effects; hence the low estimated costs of 
protection discussed in section 2. In an imperfectly competitive world that is not 
first-best Pareto-optimal, interventions have large first-order welfare effects. The 
first-order welfare losses of protection were discussed in this section. As Romer 
(1994, p. 8) puts it: 'the assertion that an equilibrium is not first-best Pareto- 
optimal does not validate any arbitrary intervention. It just raises the stakes. 
Trade restrictions are a little bit harmful in the usual model of perfect markets. 
They are very harmful in the second-best world. '32 
5 CURRENT ISSUES 
The traditional economic analysis of trade policy based on perfect competition, 
with its shortcomings emphasized above, has one great advantage: in theory pro- 
tection is almost always harmful. In contrast, the new trade theory, developed to 
explain the stylized facts of international trade allows for 'strategic' trade poli- 
cies. Thus, a major disadvantage of the new trade theory is the ease with which 
it can be abused to validate demands for protectionist measures. The current fear 
of competition from 'low wage' countries further fuels this demand. Thus, lob- 
byists for special interest groups can attract a lot of sympathy for their case by 
simultaneously pointing at 'unfair' competition from low-wage countries and us- 
ing semi-sophisticated theoretical arguments. The discussion in this section ad- 
dresses these issues and simultaneously answers question 3 posed in the intro- 
duction. 
5.1 'Strategic' Trade Policies 
An argument for trade protection, known as 'strategic' trade policy, has attracted 
a lot of attention over the past decade. We outlined in section 3 that many new 
theories have been developed to incorporate a wide range of real world phenom- 
32 Note that imperfect ompetition implies that we live in a 'second-best' world. 
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ena, such as economies of scale, imperfect competition, variety, quality improve- 
ments, etc. The details of these models differ as widely as the phenomena they 
try to explain. However, in one respect hey tend to be rather robust: government 
intervention has the potential to increase welfare. We give two examples. First 
the 'optimal' tariff rate is never zero, no matter how small the country or region 
in question (Helpman and Krugman, 1989, p. 139 and p. 143). Second, the op- 
timal government policy is to subsidize the export sector if firms compete in 
quantities. 33 
Strategic trade policy has several drawbacks. All these models are examples of 
one-shot games. Take the 'optimal' tariff argument for protection as an example. 
This is the tariff rate which maximizes a country's welfare, taking the tariff rates 
of other countries as given, i.e. in the absence of retaliation. 34 Furthermore, the 
specific welfare-maximizing policies depend crucially on the model specification. 
If producers compete on the basis of prices rather than quantities in the second 
example above, the optimal government policy is to tax rather than subsidize the 
export sector. 35 Finally, the accurate implementation of strategic trade policy by 
the government requires a formidable knowledge of all sectors in the economy 
concerning the type of competition, the knowledge spillovers, etc. In short, more 
information than is usually available. Thus, the 'free trade' policy prescription 
does not follow from imperfect competition models as an inevitable conclusion 
but, in conjunction with the high potential costs of protection discussed in the 
previous section, as a useful rule of thumb. 
5.2 Competition from Low Wage Countries 
A different, and rather crude, argument has also attracted much attention recently. 
Both the United States and Europe are currently experiencing a relative decline 
of their national economies. As was the case with Britain at the end of the nine- 
teenth century, the relative decline of an economic leader tends to increase the 
demand for protectionism. The cause of such fears is the increased economic im- 
portance of the 'emerging economies.' Protectionist measures are often motivated 
by stating that 'our markets are more open than yours.' These claims, e.g. illus- 
trated by anecdotal evidence of Japan's closed market, may to some extent be 
33 See, for example, Brander and Spencer (1985), Spencer and Brander (1983) and the survey of 
Brander (1995). 
34 One can now investigate a game in which all countries are involved in a Nash game to set their 
'optimal' tariff rate to arrive at a non-zero Nash equilibrium 'optimal' tariff rate for all countries. In
the process all countries are adjusting their tariffs, violating the basic non-retaliation assumption. More 
importantly, the final equilibrium tariff rate is not optimal because all countries could do better by 
charging azero tariff. It is the classic example of a prisoner's dilemma, discussed further in the next 
section. 
35 Further complications arise with other strategic variables, first and second-mover problems, etc. 
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correct, but as Table 2 shows Japan's tariff rates are among the lowest in the 
world. 
The employment problems in Europe and the United States are often attrib- 
uted to 'unfair' competition from low-wage countries (Krugman and Lawrence, 
1993b). According to this argument less developed countries and countries from 
Eastern Europe with huge supplies of unskilled and low-paid workers are respon- 
sible for the high levels of unemployment in Europe and the United States. The 
wages in these countries are so low that the rich countries cannot compete any- 
more. In this context it has been pointed out repeatedly that labour conditions in 
third world countries are often appalling, just think of involuntary child labour. 
Tackling the source of the problem, by helping to improve labour conditions, fa- 
cilitating better schooling and trying to convince other countries to pass and en- 
force child labour protection laws, is obviously superior to the advocated impo- 
sition of trade restrictions on the goods the poor countries are exporting. The 
latter not only hurts the developing nations, and thereby aggravates the problem, 
but also gives the impression that the proponents of such trade restrictions are 
more concerned about their constituents are (re-)election than the labour condi- 
tions in developing countries. These arguments are not only almost always (mis-) 
used in an ad hoc manner to demand more protectionist measures, they are also 
almost always wrong (see also subsection 6.1). 
In a recent debate in Foreign Affairs (1994, March/April and July/August) two 
opposing views are distinguished. Both views take the premise that governments 
should act in the interest of their own constituents, and not of the world as a 
whole, as starting point. On the one hand, Krugman (1994) claims that the ob- 
session with competitiveness i  based on wrong conceptions and erroneous data. 36 
On the other hand, various authors claim that the United States and Europe on 
the one hand and the emerging economies on the other flight a competitiveness 
battle with each other (like Pepsi-Cola and Coca-Cola) which is unwinnable for 
Europe and the United States because of the low wages in, for instance, Asia. 
The latter claims are wrong. First, low wages are accompanied by low labour 
productivity. Furthermore, competitiveness i  a complex variable which not only 
consists of labour costs but also on (the efficiency of) the financial sector, govern- 
ment policies, economic stability, monetary policies, etc. Taking a variety of these 
factors into account The Netherlands, for example, is number eight in a ranking 
of the most competitive nations despite relatively high wages (behind, among oth- 
ers, the United States, Japan and Germany; Van der Zwet, 1995). Thus compar- 
ing wages is not very informative for measuring competitiveness. It is important 
36 Specifically, Krugman (1994) shows that he employment problems of the United States are 
caused by internal problems and are not caused by increased foreign competitiveness. Thedecrease in 
employment i  he industrial sector and the diminishing share of this sector in GDP are largely due to 
the growth of (labour) productivity in the industrial sector. Grosso modo these conclusions also apply 
for The Netherlands (Van tier Zwet, 1995). 
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in this respect o point out that the major competitors of, for example, many 
Dutch producers are located in Germany, Belgium, France, etc., all of which are 
not low-wage countries. Second, the theories of international trade explain that 
everyone can still benefit from international trade, based on comparative advan- 
tage, economies of scale, variety, quality, etc. Third, the fact that productivity 
growth in Asia is higher than in the United States or Europe poses no particular 
threat o the latter countries because of the low starting value of productivity in 
the (initially) less developed country. For example, Pilat (1993) shows that a 
South Korean labourer was only 9 percent as productive as an American labourer 
in 1975. Fourth, real wages are unaffected by productivity growth abroad, but 
only depend on productivity at home. This holds even if one country surpasses 
another. Finally, foreign competitive pressure and the threat of copying ideas 
(without payment) from leading industrial nations may be welfare increasing in a 
dynamic ontext because attempts to stay one step ahead of the copiers increases 
the rate of innovation in the developed world (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). 
In response to the competitive pressures from low-wage countries in Asia and 
Eastern Europe the countries of the European Union have to adapt their produc- 
tion processes according to their comparative advantage, that is toward medium 
and high-technology sectors. Germany, for example, clearly benefits from its 
know-how in machine production in view of the increased investment demand 
from newly industrializing countries in Eastern Europe and Asia. Other countries, 
notably The Netherlands, benefit indirectly as suppliers of intermediates to the 
German machine industry, or simply from the rising demand from germany in 
general. Although comparative advantage may thus change from one good to an- 
other over time, giving rise to adaptation problems, trade based on comparative 
advantage, conomies of scale, quality of variety remains beneficial to all. Con- 
cluding this section we do not want to play down the (temporary) adverse ffects 
for some industries and workers involved, which can be very severe indeed, but 
our conviction is that there is no viable alternative to participation in the inter- 
national trade game. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Europe should welcome low-cost competition from other parts of the world, such 
as Eastern Europe and South east Asia. This simply reflects shifting patterns of 
dynamic comparative advantage, the development of nations and the extent to 
which some goods are no longer in the 'high-technology' categories of produc- 
tion. Meeting the competitive challenge spurs innovation and increases produc- 
tivity. The demand for protection under these circumstances is largely based on 
misconceptions and erroneous data. For example, low wages are accompanied by 
low productivity, while economic development opens new opportunities for a va- 
riety of sectors. Desperately trying to hold on to uncompetitive industries is about 
as useful as trying to stop the sun from rising in the morning. We saw before, in 
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section 4, that the costs of protection may be underestimated. The danger is that 
it might, in conjunction with the continuing demand for protection, ill founded or 
not, lead to a continuing (and excessive) supply of protection, as shown in 
Tables 2 and 3. 
6 TRADE POLICY UNDER IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
If flee trade is better than managed trade, what is the best policy option for a 
government in a world where other governments protect their national markets? 
Two options come to the fore: (i) participate in international negotiations which 
reduce protection between participating countries and (ii) retaliatory measures 
which coerce trading partners to become more liberal with respect o trade poli- 
cies. In practice the first option leads to ever larger regional trading blocs. This 
option has the intuitive appeal that the process leads to more free trade and in 
principle should only stop when the whole world has joined a free trade zone. 
However, it also has its drawbacks as discussed below. The second option leads 
to power politics and the risk that trade policy becomes entrapped in ever esca- 
lating retaliatory measures. The consequences of this policy will also be dis- 
cussed below. 
6.1 Regional Trade Arrangements 
The formation of regional trade arrangements has become increasingly popular. 
The extension of the European Union with new members and the formation of 
NAFTA are examples of increasing regionalization. 37According to the (former) 
GATT, regionalism should be a step in the process towards freer trade (article 
XXIV of the GATT). At first sight the formation of ever larger regional free trade 
blocs is a sound policy towards the eventual goal of global free trade. Stimulat- 
ing regional trade blocs could, according to this line of reasoning, be a solution 
to end the (non-tariff) demand for protection, because members will be forced 
towards trade liberalization within the regional trade bloc. 
Sir James Goldsmith, member of the European Parliament, advocates the for- 
mation of large regional trade blocs with open and free competition within each 
regional trade bloc. 3a However, he also advocates restricted bilateral trade agree- 
ments with other regions. His arguments in favour of this policy prescription are 
based on the fear of competition from low-wage countries and the illusion that 
37 Other egional blocks are the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDAEC), the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), the Andean Pact and the Central American Common Market (CACM), 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), in eastern and southern Africa, the Cross Border Initiative 
(CBI), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). These are only a few of 
the more than sixty trade arrangements which can be identified (IMF, 1994, Vol. II, Appendix I). 
38 Sir James's opinion is expressed in the interview Global Free Trade and GATI" (1994). 
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(p. 2): 'technology can be transferred instantaneously anywhere in the world on 
the back of a micro-chip.' Moreover, it relies heavily on the notion that balanced 
trade between a high-wage and a low-wage country is somehow detrimental to 
the high-wage country because (p. 4): 'The number of people employed annually 
to produce one billion dollars worth of high tech products in the developed na- 
tions could be under 1,000. But the number of people employed in the low-cost 
areas to manufacture the products that we import would amount o tens of thou- 
sands of people.' This line of reasoning is based on the well-known fallacy of 
unequal exchange. According to this reasoning a lawyer who sells his legal ad- 
vice for $300 per hour is at a disadvantage when exchanging this one hour with 
a painter who paints his house in 10 hours and earns $30 per hour. We, however, 
would rather be lawyers than painters. 
At a more fundamental level this raises the question whether the formation of 
ever larger regional trading blocs is welfare increasing or welfare reducing. 
Krugman (1993) shows that a small number of regional trade blocs actually re- 
duces global and regional welfare. His argument runs as follows. 
Suppose the world is organized in B identical trading blocs of equal economic 
size and with free trade within each bloc. Each bloc consists of more than one 
country and each bloc levies the 'optimal' tariff in a Nash equilibrium game, that 
is, given the tariff levels of the other trading blocs. The formation of fewer and 
therefore larger blocs leads to both trade creation and trade diversion. Trade cre- 
ation, because the new members can participate in free trade within each bloc. 
Trade diversion, because larger blocs have more market power in the world, 
which increases the Nash equilibrium tariff. Furthermore, a higher tariff diverts 
trade that would otherwise take place between the blocs before integration took 
place. A smaller number of blocs thus has an ambiguous effect on economic wel- 
fare; a positive effect caused by trade creation and a negative effect caused by 
trade diversion. In this model welfare is of course maximized with only one glo- 
bal trading bloc. However, if the number of trading blocs exceeds a certain thresh- 
old level, a further increase in the number of trading blocks increases welfare; in 
this case the market power of each trading block is small and so is the corre- 
sponding Nash equilibrium tariff. In numerical examples Krugman (1993a) shows 
that the welfare minimizing number of blocs appears to be close to three. 
This model is, of course, highly abstract and has been criticized for a number 
of reasons (see the discussion accompanying Krugman, 1993a). It is, for instance, 
likely that the trade creation aspect of the formation of trading blocs will domi- 
nate the trade diversion aspect, because blocs are usually formed by countries 
already trading a lot among themselves. These strong trade relations are often the 
reason to form a trade block in the first place. Moreover, experience over the 
past few decades does not indicate that in the formation of trading blocs, which 
leads to lower or abolished trade restrictions within the trading bloc, is on aver- 
age accompanied by higher trade restrictions between the trading bloc and the 
outside world, as Krugman's analysis based on the 'optimal' tariff argument in a 
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Nash equilibrium game would indicate. For example, the formation of the 
European Union has also reduced trade barriers with outsiders as the WTO (1995) 
has pointed out. The focal point of Krugman's analysis, however, is that trade 
blocs might harm welfare if they simultaneously create trade impediments be- 
tween large trading blocs, as advocated by Sir James Goldsmith. Indeed, accord- 
ing to Krugman's analysis James Goldsmith's plan seems almost perfectly de- 
signed to minimize rather than maximize regional and global welfare. 
6.2 Power of Politics? 
As we noted above competition policies play an increasing role in the interna- 
tional game of protectionism. 'Unfair' trading practices by one trading bloc 'de- 
mand' retaliatory measures from another in order to open up the market of the 
first again. Some of Japan's trading partners, for example, have the perception 
that they are denied free access to the Japanese market. Although many frictions 
relating to competition policies have involved Japan, these types of frictions are 
present in all trading blocs (IMF, 1994, Vol. II). At the April 1994 Marrakesh 
meeting a number of countries expressed the view that competition policies 
should be included in WTO's future agenda. This issue takes us back to the fa- 
mous question already posed by Adam Smith: would one renounce free trade for 
oneself if others did not embrace it too? 39 Thus, if one is involved in retaliatory 
measures the important question remains to what extent his will inflict harm on 
oneself and whether or not these measures will lead to the ultimate goal of glo- 
bal free trade. 
Imposing protectionist measures may be beneficial in the short run for the im- 
posing country under specific circumstances and in the absence of retaliation (for 
example due to a terms-of-trade effect). The short-run benefits may tempt coun- 
tries, for example Japan, to actually impose protectionist measures. As has been 
extensively discussed in section 4, however, imposing protectionist measures leads 
to (potentially) high costs in the long run. These costs largely arise from lagging 
productivity gains, such as invented intermediate or final goods not introduced on 
the market, a slower rate of quality improvement, a failure to benefit from econo- 
mies of scale and scope, the inability to circumvent domestic bottleneck sectors, 
etc. Thus, the Japanese decision to heavily protect its domestic rice industry has 
not made the Japanese rice industry very efficient compared to other rice produc- 
ing countries, at least not as efficient as it could have been in the absence of 
protection. On the contrary, the price of rice in Japan is 5 times the world price 
level. Similarly, the strong protection of the automobile, radio and television in- 
dustries in the former Soviet Union has not led to products of modern design, 
nor to high quality or reliability. It has also not led to efficient production of 
these goods in the Soviet Union. 
39 A short history of the various answers to this question can be found in Bhagwati (1993). 
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The main concern of governments is the welfare level of their own citizens. 
Europe might consider the costs of protection imposed by Japan a problem be- 
tween the Japanese government and the Japanese inhabitants if it would only lead 
to high costs for the Japanese society and not for the Europeans. However, this is 
not the case because Japanese protectionist measures also harm other countries 
due to lower gains from international trade. Thus, European citizens or interest 
groups demand some policy action from their government. European politicians, 
with a preference for dynamic actions and television coverage, might therefore 
be tempted to retaliate by imposing protectionist measures as well. This is a bad 
option in the long run for the exact same reasons as protectionism is bad for 
Japan in the long run. 
Acknowledging that protection is bad in the long run, one might hope that 
temporary imposition of retaliatory measures might be beneficial if it quickly 
leads to the mutual abolishment of protectionist measures by Japan and Europe. 
This is the recent policy approach of the United States with respect o Japan and 
China. 4° The important inherent danger of this approach is that this intentionally 
short-run policy can lead to long-run protection. Countries are not willing to con- 
cede that they were the first to impose 'unfair' trading practices. Indeed, usually 
all participants believe that actions on their part are necessary reactions to the 
unfair trading practices of others. Moreover, processes of escalating retaliation 
may also start to involve other sectors of the economy and other countries. For 
example, in the 1986 trade conflict with France, the United States deliberately 
threatened to target cheese imports from The Netherlands with a 100% import 
tariff. Although the power politics option seems to work in some cases it is not a 
viable structural solution due to the unpredictable outcome, the search for future 
revenge by the 'losers' and the inherent danger of escalating protection. 
6.3 Policy Advice 
We advocate a non-spectacular, but constructive policy in response to question 2 
posed in the introduction: Europe should engage in continued multilateral trade 
negotiations strengthened by corporate diplomacy. Continued multilateral trade ne- 
gotiations under supervision of the World Trade Organization and the formation 
of more or larger regional trade blocs will lead to more free trade, provided that 
barriers to trade with outsiders are also lifted (see subsection 6.1). For example, 
by effectuating the lowest possible outside barrier of the participating countries in 
a preferential trade agreement. Susan Strange (1995) notes that quiet corporate 
diplomacy is more effective in lifting trade barriers than power politics, in the 
40 This action by the United States i  beneficial only to Europe because both Japan and the United 
States will divert some of their trade from each other to Europe. As such, Europe is a free rider in 
the punishing strategy ofthe United States. Obviously, if Europe were to propose this as a structural 
solution to trade conflicts, Japan and the United States might not agree. 
252 S. BRAKMAN AND CH. VAN MARREWIJK 
case of Japan. For example, Coca Cola made a breakthrough in 1956 on the 
heavily protected Japanese market using firm-firm diplomacy by negotiating a bot- 
tling deal with Kirin, the biggest Japanese beer company. Furthermore, she notes 
(pp. 17-18) that firms are more successful because they seem to have a more 
friendly attitude and are more open-minded than government officials. Finally, we 
would like to recall that trade restrictions lead to very high costs for the impos- 
ing country over time. In this respect he following warning of The Economist 
(September 16, 1995, p. 33) should always be on the minds of trade politicians: 
'Thinking of free trade as a concession to others, rather than a boon for one's 
own citizens, is a cardinal error in trade diplomacy.' 
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The phrase 'a perfect model for an imperfect world' adequately described our 
initial findings in this paper. The static, perfect competition, constant returns to 
scale, factor endowment model of Heckscher, Ohlin, Samuelson and Vanek is of 
great analytical and graphical beauty. Unfortunately, this intellectually perfect 
model has limited explanatory power in an imperfect, dynamic world pervaded 
by economies of scale and scope, imperfect competition, knowledge spillovers, 
quality improvements, inventions of new varieties, etc. The paper argues that the 
very low estimated costs of protection in this perfect neo-classical model are mis- 
leading. 
A wide range of models has been developed over the past two decades or so 
to address the real world issues mentioned above. They frequently rely on spe- 
cific functional forms to get the main point across. In the details of predictions 
and policy prescriptions these models open up a Pandora's box of contradictions. 
Should one tax or subsidize the export sector in the absence of retaliation? The 
answer depends on the type of competition (quantity or price), other strategic 
variables (capacity), and timing (who moves first, second, third, etc.). 
In an imperfect world politicians give in, at least to some extent, to the de- 
mands for protection from lobby groups, which can be either politically, income, 
employment, environmentally or ethically oriented. Our policy advice to Europe 
for cases when some of the players are not following the rules of the game which 
lead to free trade consists of three parts. 41 
First, in some exceptional cases countries adhering to the optimal outcome of 
free trade can indeed resort to 'tit for tat' strategies in trying to convince other 
players to follow the rules of the game. We do not advocate this as a structural 
solution. 
Second, the slow but constructive process of multilateral trade negotiations, in
practice often leading to regional trade blocs, is probably the most reliable road 
41 We do not want o imply that Europe itself follows 'the rules of the game.' 
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towards reaping the benefits of free trade. This process is enhanced by the effec- 
tiveness of quiet corporate diplomacy in reducing trade barriers. 
Third, and most importantly, protectionist measures are too often used by all 
players involved. The last policy prescription follows from the seriously under- 
estimated costs of protection i  a dynamic world of imperfect competition. Shield- 
ing your producers from the cold winds of intemational competition over time 
deprives them of important technological breakthroughs in terms of variety ex- 
tensions, quality improvements, knowledge spillovers, etc. This, in turn, reduces 
their competitiveness, resulting in a sliding scale of competitiveness by demand- 
ing more protection. In a dynamic world of imperfect competition and intra-in- 
dustry trade the benefits of international trade are enormous. The stakes are sim- 
ply too high to allow for extended periods of protection in almost any sector of 
the economy. The seriously underestimated costs associated with the political in- 
struments of trade protection have tempted govemments all over the world to 
excessively use protection. After all, it is easier to pull the trigger (impose pro- 
tectionist measures) if you are involved in a game trying to shoot a beer can off 
a fence (representing the low estimated cost of protection) than if the gun is 
pointed at your head in a game of Russian roulette (representing the high actual 
costs of protection). 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Helpman (1987) derives a simple gravity model, with economies of scale, prod- 
uct differentiation and imperfect markets. Suppose there are two sectors in the 
economy, X and Y (the numrraire). Both sectors produce a large number of dif- 
ferentiated products with internal economies of scale under monopolistic ompe- 
tition. Free entry assures the absence of profits and determines the number of 
varieties. Let X be the total production of X at home and x the amount of X per 
variety. Foreign variables are indicated by an asterisk (*). Then the number of 
varieties equals: 
n=X/x (for the foreign country the expression is analogous). 
Assuming identical homothetic preferences of the Dixit-Stiglitz type in both 
countries each variety will be consumed in the ratio of: 
s=GNP/(GNP+GNP*); thus s*=. l -s .  
The value of exports of X for the home country equals: 
s*nxp=s*Xp 
p is the price of x; (for Y the equations are analogous) 
254 S. BRAKMAN AND CH. VAN MARREWIJK 
and for the foreign country 
sn*xp=sX*P. 
The total volume of trade, V, can be derived as follows: 
V= s(pX* + Y*) + s*(pX + Y)= sGNP* + s*GNP= 2 sGNP*. 
The last step assumes equilibrium on the current account. This expression can 
be re-written as: 
V=2 sGNP*=2 ss*(GNP+GNP*). 
This expression is a basic variant of the gravity model and can be extended to 
incorporate more countries and inter-industry trade. 
APPENDIX B 
Data listings are too substantial to be presented here and are available from the 
authors upon request. A summary description of the data is given below. 
Distances between countries are derived by assuming the world is a perfect 
sphere with a circumference of approx. 40,055 km and then by calculating the 
distance between capital cites on the basis of degrees latitude and longitude. The 
advantage is that with k countries only k data have to be gathered instead of 
k(k-1)/2. 
Bilateral trade data for 1992 and, in principle, 199 countries (resulting in a 
total of 199× 198 bilateral trade flows) are taken into account. Since some entries 
are zero and some are not available only the positive bilateral trade flows are 
investigated. Finally, the largest subset for which all necessary data are available 
is used (leading to 5984 data entries). 
Data for GDP are adjusted for purchasing power differences and are derived 
from the PENN World Tables 5.6. Tariff data are taken from the Barro-Lee 
data set and are own-import weighted tariff rates on intermediate inputs and 
capital goods (constructed from UNCTAD data). The Bah'o-Lee data are avail- 
able from an anonymous ftp, address: NBER.HARVARD.EDU in the directory 
pub/barro.lee. 
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Summary  
TRADE POLICY UNDER IMPERFECT COMPETITION: THE ECONOMICS OF RUSSIAN 
ROULETTE 
Neo-classical economic theory shows that managed trade or protectionism is (almost) always welfare 
decreasing. However, measurements of the welfare costs of protectionism based on neo-classical mod- 
els seem to suggest hat these costs are quite small. We discuss general new insights and develop- 
ments in the theory, policy and empiricism of international trade. The observation that intra-industry 
trade and the services ector are important has led to a shift in theory away from constant retums to 
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scale and perfect competition towards economies of scale and scope, externalities, market imperfec- 
tions, and imperfect competition. Although this, in principle, opens the door to beneficial government 
intervention i  the economic process, we emphasize that the tree costs of protection can potentially 
be much higher than is generally acknowledged as a result of the above mentioned shift. 
